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Collaborating to Compete
Abstract
In collaborating to compete, firms forge different types of strategic alliances: same-function alliances, parallel
development of new products, and cross-functional alliances. A major challenge in the management of these
alliances is how to control the resource commitment of partners to the collaboration. In this research we
examine both theoretically and experimentally how the type of an alliance and the prescribed profit-sharing
arrangement affect the resource commitments of partners. We model the interaction within an alliance as a
non-cooperative variable-sum game, in which each firm invests part of its resources to increase the utility of a
new product offering. Different types of alliances are modeled by varying how the resources committed by
partners in an alliance determine the utility of the jointly-developed new product. We then model the inter-
alliance competition by nesting two independent intra-alliance games in a supergame in which the groups
compete for a market. The partners of the winning alliance share the profits in one of two ways: equally or
proportionally to their investments. The Nash equilibrium solutions for the resulting games are examined.
In the case of same-function alliances, when the market is large the predicted investment patterns under both
profit sharing rules are comparable. Partners developing new products in parallel, unlike the partners in a same
function alliance, commit fewer resources to their alliance. Further, the profit-sharing arrangement matters in
such alliances -- partners commit more resources when profits are shared proportionally rather than equally.
We test the predictions of the model in two laboratory experiments. We find that the aggregate behavior of the
subjects is accounted for remarkably well by the equilibrium solution. As predicted, profitsharing arrangement
did not affect the investment pattern of subjects in same-function alliances when they were in the high-reward
condition. Subjects developing products in parallel invested less than subjects in same-function alliance,
irrespective of the reward condition. We notice that theory seems to under-predict investments in low-reward
conditions. A plausible explanation for this departure from the normative benchmark is that subjects in the
low-reward condition were influenced by altruistic regard for their partners. These experiments also clarify the
support for the mixed strategy equilibrium: aggregate behavior conforms to the equilibrium solution, though
the behavior of individual subjects varies substantially from the norm. Individual-level analysis suggests that
subjects employ mixed strategies, but not as fully as the theory demands. This inertia in choice of strategies is
consistent with learning trends observed in the investment pattern.
A new analysis of Robertson and Gatignon' s (1998) field survey data on the conduct of corporate partners in
technology alliances is also consistent with our model of same-function alliances.
We extend the model to consider asymmetric distribution of endowments among partners in a same-function
alliance. Then we examine the implication of extending the strategy space to include more levels of
investment. Finally, we outline an extension of the model to consider cross-functional alliances.
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Abstract 
In collaborating to compete, firms forge different types of strategic alliances: same-function 
alliances, parallel development of new products, and cross-functional alliances. A major challenge in the 
management of these alliances is how to control the resource commitment of partners to the 
collaboration. In this research we examine both theoretically and experimentally how the type of an 
alliance and the prescribed profit-sharing arrangement affect the resource commitments of partners. We 
model the interaction within an alliance as a non-cooperative variable-sum game, in which each firm 
invests part of its resources to increase the utility of a new product offering. Different types of alliances 
are modeled by varying how the resources committed by partners in an alliance determine the utility of 
the jointly-developed new product. We then model the inter-alliance competition by nesting two 
independent intra-alliance games in a supergame in which the groups compete for a market. The partners 
of the winning alliance share the profits in one of two ways: equally or proportionally to their 
investments. The Nash equilibrium solutions for the resulting games are examined. 
In the case of same-function alliances, when the market is large the predicted investment patterns 
under both profit sharing rules are comparable. Partners developing new products in parallel, unlike the 
partners in a same function alliance, commit fewer resources to their alliance. Further, the profit-sharing 
arrangement matters in such alliances -- partners commit more resources when profits are shared 
proportionally rather than equally. 
We test the predictions of the model in two laboratory experiments. We find that the aggregate 
behavior of the subjects is accounted for remarkably well by the equilibrium solution. As predicted, profit-
sharing arrangement did not affect the investment pattern of subjects in same-function alliances when they 
were in the high-reward condition. Subjects developing products in parallel invested less than subjects in 
same-function alliance, irrespective of the reward condition. We notice that theory seems to under-predict 
investments in low-reward conditions. A plausible explanation for this departure from the normative 
benchmark is that subjects in the low-reward condition were influenced by altruistic regard for their 
partners. These experiments also clarify the support for the mixed strategy equilibrium: aggregate 
behavior conforms to the equilibrium solution, though the behavior of individual subjects varies 
substantially from the norm. Individual-level analysis suggests that subjects employ mixed strategies, but 
not as fully as the theory demands. This inertia in choice of strategies is consistent with learning trends 
observed in the investment pattern. 
A new analysis of Robertson and Gatignon' s (1998) field survey data on the conduct of corporate 
partners in technology alliances is also consistent with our model of same-function alliances. 
We extend the model to consider asymmetric distribution of endowments among partners in a 
same-function alliance. Then we examine the implication of extending the strategy space to include more 
levels of investment. Finally, we outline an extension of the model to consider cross-functional alliances. 
Keywords: Strategic alliances, experimental economics, behavioral game theory, new product 
development 
1. Introduction 
Given the complexity of developing and marketing new technology products, firms often 
find it advantageous to compete by forging alliances (e.g., Gomes-Casseras 1994, Yoshino and 
Rangan 1995). The nature of strategic alliances can vary widely. For example, firms might 
attempt to obtain greater efficiencies of scale by pooling resources within common functional 
areas (such as merging R&D resources), take advantage of complementary skills by pooling 
resources across functions (such as teaming R&D and marketing functions), or develop new 
products in parallel. We see GM and Suzuki combining technological resources to manufacture 
cars, Siemens and Coming forming a cross-functional alliance to produce and market fiber-optic 
cables, and Intel and AMD developing new products in parallel that are shared by both partners. 
Although alliances offer the potential benefit of allowing firms to access a greater base of 
resources, they also carry an ancillary risk: in exchange for this advantage, the firm forgoes its 
ability to control its own destiny in the marketplace. Specifically, a firm's success now becomes 
contingent on the willingness of its partners to commit their resources to the venture. When 
engaged in an alliance a firm thus faces the risk that partners may free ride on its efforts, an 
action that could undermine the chance of succeeding in a competitive market (Kogut 1988). A 
major challenge faced by alliances is thus to identify mechanisms that minimize the risk of 
under-commitment by partners. 
While the study of strategic alliances forms a growing part of the literature in 
management strategy and marketing, our knowledge about how resource-commitment decisions 
are influenced by the alliance's structure is both limited and, at times, contradictory (see Harrigan 
1988, Bucklin and Sengupta 1993, Dutta and Weiss 1997, and Roberston and Gatignon 1998 for 
reviews). To illustrate, consider the conventional wisdom held by many alliance managers that 
arrangements to share profits equally should be avoided because they provide opportunities for 
free riding (e.g., Bleeke and Ernst 1991, Mody 1993). While this conventional wisdom is 
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intuitively appealing, a 1991 survey by McKinsey suggests that the reality might be just the 
opposite: the survey found that 60% of the sampled alliances in which partners shared profits 
equally were, in fact, successful (Bleeke and Ernst 1991 ). Which of these views is correct? The 
answer, of course, lies between these extremes: although free riding will almost certainly occur in 
some equal profit-sharing arrangements, there may be some predictable conditions under which 
the temptation will be overlooked by partners, causing it to emerge as an optimal arrangement. 
The purpose of this research is to take an initial step toward a systematic understanding of 
how resource commitments of partners are influenced by the structural features of competing 
alliances. We examine how the resource commitments of alliance partners are influenced by 
three structural variables: the profit-sharing arrangement, the type of the alliance as modeled by 
the rule for combining partners' inputs, and the size of the market reward for winning the inter-
alliance competition. We pursue this goal both theoretically and empirically. We first study the 
normative effect of changes in these alliance properties on resource-commitment decisions by 
constructing a game-theoretic model of competing alliances. We then examine the ability of this 
model to explain the actual resource-commitment decisions made by alliance partners in a 
controlled laboratory setting. 
Our model suggests that there exist conditions in which the profit-sharing arrangement 
has very little effect on the resources committed by firms - a result that runs counter to some 
intuitions. Specifically, this arises in cases where the reward for winning the competition is high 
and the type of the alliance calls for resources to be pooled as a simple sum of the inputs-a 
combination rule that often arises in same-function alliances. We also find that alliances that call 
for resources to be pooled as the maximum of inputs - such as when new products are being 
developed in parallel - are potentially disadvantageous: Partners in such alliances will rationally 
commit fewer resources; and partners sharing profits equally will commit even fewer resources 
than those sharing profits proportionally, even when the reward is large. 
3 
Our laboratory experiments support these predictions. A major exception arises in cases 
where alliances compete in settings of low market demand, where the theory predicts that 
partners will exploit free-riding opportunities and under-commit resources. In such cases, we find 
that players over-commit resources relative to the normative benchmark, displaying altruistic 
regard for partners similar to that often seen in experimental tests of the Prisoner's Dilemma, 
Ultimatum game, and Dictator game (e.g., Dawes 1980, Dawes and Thaler 1988). A new analysis 
of Robertson and Gatignon's (1998) field survey data on the conduct of corporate partners in 
technology alliances is also consistent with our model of same-function alliances. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce a game-theoretic 
model of competition between two alliances, and in Section 3 we explore its implications for 
rational resource-commitment decisions by partner firms. Section 4 reports the results of two 
laboratory experiments designed to test the model predictions. In Section 5 we conclude by 
discussing the managerial implications of our findings, the limitations of the basic model, some 
extensions of basic model, and a few directions for future research. 
2. Model Development 
Consider two alliances, i and j, who are competing to develop a new product. Each 
alliance consists of two partnering firms, each of which faces the decision of how much capital to 
invest in the joint endeavor. 1 Our interest is in modeling how this decision will be rationally 
influenced by three exogenous structural variables: the type of alliance, the profit-sharing 
arrangement, and market size. 
We assume that each partner in the competing alliances is endowed with the same amount 
of capital, c. Each firm then independently determines the amount of capital it wants to commit 
to the alliance. We denote the actual investment of partner k, k e { 1 ,2}, in alliance i by l;k. Each 
firm can invest at most c units of resources, i.e., l;k 5 c. Our basic model limits the investment 
1 While limiting an alliance to only two partners is potentially a restrictive assumption, a recent study notes that 79% of 
technology alliances in fact have only two partners (Robertson and Gatignon 1998). 
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strategy space of the firm to three levels: 0, c/2, and c. We restrict the investment strategy space 
to three levels for two major reasons. First, it keeps the decision problem cognitively simpler and 
more amenable to a rigorous experimental investigation (e.g., Smith 1982, Rapoport 1987). 
Second, it renders the solution mathematically tractable. We relax this simplifying assumption in 
Section 5 by allowing for more levels of investment. 
We further assume that no single firm has sufficient resources to develop the new product 
without the support of its partners. The investments of partners in an alliance are pooled to 
determine the value or utility that consumers associate with the new product developed by the 
alliance. We denote the overall value of the product developed by alliance i by U(i). While the 
overall value of a product depends on the inputs of partners, consumers do not observe the 
specific input of each partner. As we discuss later in more detail, different types of alliances 
result in different pooling rules. 
The alliance that invests more pooled resources wins the competition and gets a reward 
m. The losing alliance gets 0. Such a winner-take-all assumption is common in the literature on 
patent races (e.g., Gilbert and Newberry, 1982, Fudenberg, Gilbert, Stiglitz and Tirole 1983). The 
winning alliance can secure monopoly profit through patent protection. Later we relax this 
winner-take-all assumption by allowing for a side benefit that the losing alliance gets regardless 
of the outcome of the competition. 2 In case both alliances invest equal resources, an event that is 
of significance when the investment of partnering firms is limited to discrete levels, we assume 
that each alliance gets a rewards. If s = 0, both alliances make no incremental profit in case of a 
tie. Such an assumption is tenable if the two alliances compete away all potential profits when 
they introduce simultaneously similar products. Alternatively, if s = m/2, both alliances share the 
2 Also, the probability of winning can depend on the relative investments of the competing alliances. In such a formulation 
investing more doesn't guarantee winning, though it increases the probability of winning. This adds a layer of uncertainty (say 
due to technology or consumer choice process) in the model. In this initial step to model inter-alliance competition, the winning 
alliance is decided deterministically so that the feedback to subjects is not noisy. 
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market equally, when they introduce comparable new products. Regardless of the outcome of the 
inter-alliance competition, each firm's investment is sunk and non-recoverable. 
Type of Alliance. The type of alliance is captured by how the investments of the partnering firms 
are pooled to determine the value or utility of the new product. Two types are considered. 
1. The utility of the new product developed by the alliance is determined by the sum of 
the investments made by the partnering firms. This captures the spirit of same-function 
alliances. For example, GM and Suzuki manufacture cars together, while Motorola and 
Toshiba jointly produce microprocessors (Bleeke and Ernst 1991 and Gomes-Casseres 
1994). These firms pool similar resources and skills, and to some extent this implies that 
the firms' inputs combine in a compensatory fashion. 
2. Alternatively, the utility of the new product is determined by the maximum individual 
input of a partner in an alliance. This pooling rule captures the spirit of parallel 
development alliances. For instance, Texas Instruments and its partner Hitachi developed 
in parallel alternative 16-megabit DRAM chips (Dreyfuss et al 1990). Biotechnology 
firms such as Genentech developed alternative prototypes of AIDS vaccine in parallel 
along with their collaborators (Henderson 1996). Until 1987 Intel and AMD developed 
new research products in parallel to be shared by both partners (Weinstein 1994). Partners 
in these alliances develop new products in parallel pursuing alternative technological 
paths, and the firm successfully developing the product shares the gains with its partners. 
Note that the success of a parallel alliance depends only on the best alternative developed 
by a partnering firm. A key motivation for forming parallel alliances is that partnering 
firms are not sure which alternative technological path is likely to succeed. 
The two pooling rules are expressed mathematically as follows. 
U (") _ {Iii + 1;2 , if alliance i is a same- function alliance 
1 - Max{Iil, 1;2 } if products are developed in parallel 
Profit Sharing Arrangement. We allow for two sharing arrangements: 
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( 1) 
1. Equal Profit Sharing. Under this arrangement, the partnering firms share the gains 
from winning equally. Each partner in the winning alliance gets m/2. In practice, firms 
often find it difficult to monitor or assess the resource committed by each partner in an 
alliance, especially when partners' inputs include intellectual properties and tacit 
knowledge (Kogut 1988). Sharing profits equally circumvents the need to monitor the 
inputs of alliance partners, but poses the threat of free riding. 
2. Proportional Profit Sharing. Under this arrangement, alliance partners share the gains 
from winning in proportion to their individual investments. This arrangement 
presupposes that the resources committed by partners can be perfectly monitored. 
However, as discussed earlier, alliance managers find it difficult to precisely evaluate the 
inputs of partners. 
The profit-sharing arrangement, the number of players in each alliance, the number of 
competing alliances, the investment capital c, the strategy space of each player, and the size of 
the reward m are all assumed to be common knowledge. Furthermore, our non-cooperative 4-
person game with simultaneous moves is played once. When the players in a non-cooperative 
game make their decisions simultaneously, they cannot condition their decisions on the behavior 
of their partners. In other words, a member of the alliance cannot monitor the behavior of its 
partner and use that information in making its decision. Thus, a non-cooperative game with 
simultaneous moves allows opportunities for partners to free ride. 
The proposed model captures some of the essential features of competition between 
alliances. For instance, partners in an alliance join together with the expressed intention of 
cooperating to win a competition. These partners need to cooperate in the presence of strong 
incentives to act otherwise (Pisano, Russo, and Teece 1988, Hamel 1991, Mody 1993). Our 
model captures the essence of such a situation by allowing opportunities for free riding. Also the 
investments of partners are often alliance specific and have limited value outside the alliance 
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(Williamson 1985, Bucklin and Sengupta 1990). In our model, the investments of alliance 
partners are sunk and nonrecoverable. This parsimonious model of competition between two 
alliances lends itself for game-theoretic analysis and experimental investigation. 
3. Analysis of the Model 
Overview. In this section we examine the effects of profit-sharing arrangement and type of 
alliance on the resource commitment of alliance partners. We first examine the case of same-
function alliance. Two levels of interaction are involved in this competition between alliances. Each 
firm is engaged in an independent intra-alliance conflict with its partner. Then, the partners in an 
alliance are jointly engaged in an inter-alliance competition. 
Case 1: Same-function alliances. Recall that we model a same-function alliance by 
allowing the utility of the new product developed by the alliance to be determined by the sum of the 
inputs of the partners (Equation 1 ). 
The Intra-alliance Conflict. The intra-alliance conflict is modeled as a non-cooperative 
two-person game in strategic form. Each player can invest either 0, c/2, or c units of capital. The 
payoffs associated with the resolution of the intra-alliance conflict involving the two players in 
alliance i, player i1 and player i2, is presented in strategic form in the upper panel of Table 1. The 
strategy of investing 0 dominates the strategy of investing c/2, and the latter strategy, in tum, 
dominates the strategy of investing c. Therefore, the equilibrium pair of strategies is (0, 0). 
---------- Insert Table 1 ----------
The Inter-alliance Competition. Next, we embed the two independent intra-alliance 
conflicts in an inter-alliance competition for the market. Consider first equal profit-sharing 
agreements, where a fixed market m is shared equally among the members of the winning 
alliance. Recall that the utility of the product of a same-function alliance is determined by the 
simple sum of the inputs of alliance partners, and that each player's strategy space includes only 
three elements. Therefore, U(i) = UUJ = {0, c/2, c, Jc/2, 2cj. The lower panel of Table 1 portrays 
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the inter-alliance competition as a non-cooperative two-person game in which each alliance has 
five pure strategies. 
We impose the condition m > 2c. This condition implies that the value of the market (m) 
is greater than the cost (2c) of participating in the inter-alliance competition. This condition 
ensures that there is an incentive for each alliance to consider participating in the game. 
Lemma 1: If s = 0 and m > 2c > 0, then the inter-alliance competition between two 
same-function alliances has only a mixed strategy solution. 
Proof: See Appendix 1.1 
As discussed earlier, the condition m > 2c implies that the market size exceeds the cost of 
the alliance engaging in the competition. The stipulation 2c > 0 means that the cost is positive. 
Also, if the competing alliances develop comparable products and share the market equally (s = 
m/2), the game has only a mixed strategy solution. We prove this claim in Appendix 1.2. 
To construct the symmetric mixed strategy solution we proceed as follows. Denote the 
probability of a player investing 0, c/2, and c units of capital by p 1, p2, and p3 , respectively. If 
everyone else invests c, then there is an incentive to invest 0 or c/2. Similarly, if everyone else 
invests c/2, then there is an incentive to invest 0 or c. Finally, if everyone else invests 0, then 
there is an incentive to invest c/2 or c. However, if one firm mixes its three strategies according 
to the equilibrium solution, then there is no incentive for the other firm to unilaterally depart 
from this action. In mixed strategy pricing models, price cuts are construed as sales promotion 
(e.g., Narasimhan 1988, Rao 1990, and Raju, Srinivasan, and Lal 1990). In our model, the under-
investments implied by mixed strategy equilibrium can be viewed as incidences of free riding. 3 
3 Mixed strategy equilibrium solutions have been used in various contexts such as models of capacity (e.g., Deneckere and Peck 
1995), models of standardization (e.g., Farrell and Saloner 1985) and models of R&D (Fudenberg and Tirole 1985). In general, a 
mixed strategy solution can be interpreted in two main ways. We can interpret mixed strategy equilibrium as a population steady 
state in which each pure strategy is played by an appropriate proportion of the population as prescribed by the equilibrium 
solution (Rosenthal 1979). Another interpretation is Harsanyi's (1973) purification idea. Each player is influenced by small 
(unmodeled) perturbations in her payoffs which are not observable by her opponents. In every replication of the game a player 
chooses the unique pure best reply in the corresponding game of incomplete information depending on the realization of the 
perturbation. The long run average of such replications may seem as if the player is randomizing among the pure strategy as 
implied by the equilibrium solution. 
9 
Lemma 2: The mixed strategy equilibrium solution for a partner in a same-function 
alliance with equal profit-sharing arrangement is given by the solution to the following system of 
three equations: 
(m/2)(p1 3 + 2 PI P2 2 + P2 2 P3 + 2 PI P3 2) = c/2, 
(m/2) (2 p/ P2 + P2 3 + 2 P2 P3 2 -2 PI P2 P3) = c/2, 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
Proof: See Appendix 1.3. The system of equations for the more general case involving s 
E { 0, m/2} is also presented in Appendix 1.3. 
Effect of profit-sharing arrangement. Consider the effect of the equal profit-sharing 
arrangement and then compare it with the proportional profit-sharing arrangement. 
Equal profit-sharing arrangement. Consider the case where partners agree to share profits 
equally. In such situations, firms have an opportunity to free ride on the efforts of their partners. 
When the size of the market, m, increases in relation to the endowment, c, the value of the capital 
to market size ratio, elm, decreases and the reward for winning the competition increases. Based 
on an analysis of the system of equations 3, 4 and 5, in Lemma 2, we characterize the mixed 
strategy solution as a function of elm. 
Lemma 3a: In same-function alliances, if the partners share profits equally, then: 
PI> P2 > P3 if 0.375 >elm> 0.244 
PI> P3 > P2 if 0.244 >elm> 0.228 
P3 >PI> P2 if 0.288 >elm> 0. 
Proof: See Appendix 1.4 
The intuition behind Lemma 3a is as follows. Each partner faces a tension between the 
desire to win the inter-alliance competition and the inclination to free ride on the investments of 
the other partners of its alliance. As the market at stake increases, the desire to win the 
competition outweighs the tendency to free ride. Consequently, alliance partners often invest 
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nothing when the market stakes are low. In other words, if elm is high (say elm > 0.375) we 
observe that Pl > P2 > p3. But if the market stakes are high, we observe that alliance partners 
often invest all their resources. That is, if elm< 0.288, then p3 > p1 > p2• 
Lemma 3b: The probabilities of investing nothing (p1) and half the resource (p2) increase 
as the capital to market size ratio increases: dp! > o dp 2 > o. Correspondingly, the probability 
c c 
d- d-
m m 
of investing all the resource (p3) decreases as the capital to market size ratio increases: 
dp3 
- < O'Vp3 E (0.084,0.475). 
c 
d-
m 
Proof: See Appendix 1.5. 
Lemma 3b reinforces the key thrust of Lemma 3a that as the reward for winning the 
competition increases, partners commit more resources to the collaborative endeavor. 
Figure 1A displays the equilibrium strategy solution when c = 2 and m E {6, 7, 8, .. ... 20}. 
The corresponding values of elm are 0.33, 0.29, 0.25, ... ,0.1. The equilibrium solution for the 
low-reward condition where elm= 0.33 is p1 = 0.502, p2 = 0.436, and p3 = 0.062. In a medium-
reward condition such as elm= 0.17, p1 = 0.135, p2 = 0.123, and p3 = 0.741. Further, in the high-
reward condition such as elm= 0.1, p 1 = 0.062, p2 = 0.060, and p3 = 0.877. 
---------- Insert Figure 1 ----------
Proportional profit-sharing arrangement. Along the lines discussed in Lemma 2, we 
constructed a similar system of three equations for computing the mixed strategy equilibrium 
solution when the partners of the winning alliance share their profit proportionally (see Appendix 
1.6). In contrast to Lemma 3a, we find that p3 > p1 > p2 for all 0 < elm < 0.5 (See Appendix 1.7 
for proof). The intuition behind this result is simple. Partners sharing profits proportionally do 
not entertain any fear of being suckered by their alliance partners, and hence often commit all 
II 
dpl 
their resources for the joint endeavor. As noted in Lemma 3b, we find again that - > o , 
c 
d-
m 
dp 2 > o and dp3 < o (see Appendix 1.8 for proof). In other words, as the reward for winning the 
c c 
d- d-
m m 
competition increases, partners commit more resources to the joint endeavor. 
Figure 1B exhibits the mixed strategy equilibrium investment pattern when partners share 
the profit proportionally. For example, in the low-reward condition (elm= 0.33), p1 = 0.361, p2 = 
0.197, and p3 = 0.442. In the medium-reward condition (elm= 0.17), P1 = 0.161, p2 = 0.052, and 
p3 = 0.786. In the high-reward condition (elm= 0.1), p1 = 0.087, P2 = 0.028, and P3 = 0.885. We 
notice that as the size of the market increases the probability of investing c increases, whereas the 
probabilities of investing c/2 and 0 decrease. 
Comparison of the profit-sharing arrangements. We can now examine whether, and if so when, 
equal profit sharing induces an investment pattern comparable to proportional profit sharing. 
Figure 1 C shows what fraction of the available capital is invested under either profit-sharing 
arrangement. Although the equilibrium investment under equal profit-sharing arrangement is 
considerably smaller in the low-reward condition (elm = 0.33), the difference between the two 
profit-sharing arrangements becomes negligible in the medium (elm = 0.17) and high-reward 
(elm= 0.1) conditions. These observations are summarized below: 
Proposition 1: When the market is large in relation to each partner's endowment, the mixed 
strategy equilibrium investment patterns under both profit-sharing arrangements are similar. 
However, when the market is small, the level of investment under the proportional profit-sharing 
arrangement is greater than that under the equal profit-sharing arrangement. 
The proportional profit-sharing arrangement helps to avoid free riding. But this 
arrangement necessitates monitoring each partner's inputs. It is sometimes difficult to monitor 
each firm's contribution to the collaboration. The equal profit-sharing arrangement circumvents 
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the need to closely monitor each firm's contribution to the collaboration, though it poses the 
threat of free riding. Yet, the proposition implies that when the market is large, the motivation to 
win the competition keeps the desire to free ride in check. Thus, when the market is relatively 
large, firms can choose to share the profits equally placing confidence in market forces to 
discipline the behavior of their partners. 
Case 2: Parallel Development of New Products. Recall that we model the parallel 
development of new products by allowing the utility of the new product to be determined by the 
maximum input of an individual member of the alliance (Equation 1). As before, we limit the 
investment space of partner k in alliance i to three levels. Consequently, the utility of the product 
developed by alliance i is confined to three levels: U(i) = {0, c/2, c). The resulting intra-alliance 
conflict between players i1 and i2 is presented in the upper panel of Table 1. The interpretation of 
the payoff matrix is the same as that discussed in same-function alliance. 
The inter-alliance competition remains a two-person non-cooperative game in strategic 
form (see lower panel of Table 1 ). The market at stake is greater than the cost of developing the 
new product, m > 2c. This implies that participating in the competition is attractive to the 
alliances. In this non-cooperative game, the alliance offering the better product wins the 
competition. In case of a tie, each alliance gets a reward of size s (s = 0, or m/2). 
Lemma 4: If m > 2c, s = 0, c > 0, and partners developing new products in parallel share 
profits equally, then the inter-alliance game only has a mixed strategy solution. 
Proof: See Appendix 1.9 
The condition that the value of the market at stake is more than the net cost of developing 
the product, m > 2c, and the stipulation that cost is positive, c > 0, are quite reasonable. The 
game only has a mixed strategy solution, if we break ties by letting each of the competing 
alliance get 50% of the market (s = m/2). This claim is proved in Appendix 1.10. 
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Effect of type of alliance. When firms in alliance i develop products in parallel, the 
partner investing the most influences the utility of the new product, U(i). How much should a 
partner in such an alliance invest in the collaboration? Should a partner invest more so that its 
investment has a critical influence on the outcome of the inter-alliance competition? Or, should 
the partner invest nothing as any investment less than the maximum has no bearing on the utility 
of the new product? Lemma 5 describes the equilibrium solution for partners developing 
products in parallel and sharing profits equally. 
Lemma 5: The mixed strategy equilibrium solution for this inter-alliance competition, 
when partners share profits equally, is: p1 = ~, p2 = p.~ and p3 = 1- (1 + p ).~, where 
p = 0.32471. 
Proof: See Appendix 1.12. The system of equations that yield the equilibrium solution 
for the more general case involving s E { 0, m/2} is presented in Appendix 1.11. 
It is evident from Lemma 5 that partners commit more resources as the market at stake 
increases. The equilibrium solution for partners in the low-reward condition (elm= 0.33) is: p1 = 
0.693, p2 = 0.225, and p3 = 0.081. In the medium-reward condition (elm= 0.17), P1 = 0.550, P2 = 
0.179, and p3 = 0.271. Finally, in the high-reward condition (elm= 0.1), PI= 0.464, P2 = 0.151, 
and p3 = 0.385. Figure 2A displays the mixed strategy equilibrium solution for the equal profit-
sharing rule. 
Lemma 6: Under equal profit-sharing arrangement, partners in parallel alliances free ride 
( p 1 = ~) more often than those in same-function alliances ( p 1 < ~ ). 
Proof: See Appendix 1.13. 
Lemma 6 provides a useful comparison of the effect of type of alliance on the behavior of 
alliance partners. Partners in a parallel alliance free ride more often than those in a same-function 
alliance. Such a behavior is a consequence of the way in which partners' inputs combine to 
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determine the utility of the new product developed by a parallel alliance: any investment less than 
the maximum has no bearing on the utility of the new product. Therefore, the inclination to 
completely free ride is stronger when products are developed in parallel. Figure 3A shows how 
partners developing a product in parallel commit fewer resources compared to those in same-
function alliances, when sharing profits equally. For instance, if sharing profits equally, partners 
in the high-reward condition (elm = 0.1) invest 90% of their capital when in a same-function 
alliance. In contrast, partners in such a reward condition and profit-sharing arrangement should 
invest only 46% of their capital, if they were developing the product in parallel. 
---------- Insert Figs. 2 and 3 ----------
The mixed strategy equilibrium solution for this inter-alliance competition, when the 
partners share profits proportionally, is given by a system of three equations (see Appendix 1.14). 
We find that: 
PI> PJ > P2 if 0.5 >elm >0.26, 
PJ >PI> P2 if 0.26 >elm >0.042, and 
PJ > P2 >PI if 0.042 >elm >0. 
This claim is proved in Appendix 1.15. When partners share profits proportionally, there is no 
scope for free riding. Hence, even in parallel alliances where the utility of the new product is 
determined by the maximum investment of a partner in the alliance, the under-investment 
problem is attenuated. Consequently, partners invest all their resources more often even if the 
api ap2 ap3 
market stakes are low (say elm < 0.26). Further, - > o, - > o, and - < o (see Appendix 
c c c 
a- a- a-
m m m 
1.16 for proof). It is interesting to note that under either profit-sharing arrangement partners 
increase their level of investment as the market at stake increases. 
Figure 2B presents the mixed strategy equilibrium solution for the proportional profit-
sharing rule. If elm= 0.33, then PI= 0.458, p2 = 0.203, and p3 = 0.339. For elm= 0.17, we find 
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that p1 = 0.323, P2 = 0.169, and P3 = 0.508. If elm= 0.1, then p1 = 0.243, p2 = 0.151, and PJ = 
0.607. Figure 3B shows that partners developing a product in parallel commit fewer resources 
compared to those in same-function alliances, when sharing profits proportionally. Hence, we 
have the following proposition based on Lemma 6 and Figure 3B. 
Proposition 2: Partners in parallel alliances commit fewer resources than those in same-
function alliances regardless of the profit-sharing arrangement. 
Effect of profit-sharing arrangement. In same-function alliances, we observed that the profit-
sharing arrangement matters when the market is small, but not when it is large (elm < 0.17). 
When products are developed in parallel, as shown in Figs. 2A and 2B and also proved earlier, 
competitive investments increase under either profit-sharing arrangement as the market at stake 
increases. If the market is infinitely large then partners sharing profits equally will commit all 
their resources in high proportions as implied by the comparative statics. However, the 
attractiveness of the market does not keep the inclination to free ride under check to the extent 
noticed in same-function alliances. Hence, partners developing products in parallel commit fewer 
resources even in the high-reward condition (elm =0.1). Further, the investments evoked by the 
two profit-sharing arrangement differ widely: Partners developing products in parallel invest 
46% and 68% of their capital depending on whether they share profits equally or proportionally, 
respectively. This difference is evident in Figure 3C. Such an investment pattern is in variance 
with the predicted behavior for same-function alliances. Therefore (see Fig. 3C) we have: 
Proposition 3. Partners developing a new product in parallel and sharing profits equally, 
instead of proportionally, commit fewer resources even in the high-reward condition. 
To summarize the theoretical results, partners make comparable investments under either 
profit-sharing arrangement in a same-function alliance, if the reward condition is high (say elm = 
0.1). Additionally, partners in a same-function alliance invest more resources than those 
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developing products in parallel. Also, partners developing products in parallel commit more 
resources under proportional profit-sharing arrangement, even in the high-reward condition. 
4. Laboratory Test 
This section describes a controlled laboratory test of some of the key theoretical results. 
Our goal is to examine to what extent the actual behavior of financially motivated agents 
conforms to the qualitative and quantitative predictions of the game-theoretical model, when 
these agents are placed in a situation that satisfies the assumptions of the model. 
We do not expect subjects to solve the resource commitment problem using the 
mathematics outlined above. In the absence of clear knowledge of how to optimally allocate 
resources, subjects may make decisions using simplifying heuristics that have limited normative 
status. One possibility is that we may observe subjects systematically over-investing out of 
altruistic respect for their partners. Such a regard for others has been observed in the play of the 
Prisoner's Dilemma (e.g., Isaac and Walker 1988), Ultimatum game (e.g., Hoffman et al 1993, 
Forsythe et al 1994) and centipede games (e.g., McKelvey and Palfrey 1992). Another possibility 
is that agents may under-invest when they recognize the opportunities for free riding. The fear of 
becoming a sucker or the greed to exploit free-riding opportunities may motivate agents to reduce 
their investment (Rapoport 1987). Further, in this game agents may even choose to invest 
nothing and take the guaranteed payoff that is equal to their endowment. We would naturally 
expect partners sharing profits proportionally to be less prone to over- or under-investment 
problem, because such a profit-sharing arrangement eliminates scope for free riding. However, it 
remains an empirical question whether subjects are sensitive to changes in either the size of 
market or the profit-sharing arrangement as predicted by theory. 
To address these issues, we examine how actual investment decisions are made in a 
simulated market of competing alliances. In this market we mimic the different types of alliances 
by appropriately modifying how the inputs of partners combine to determine the utility of a 
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hypothetical new product. We change the size of the market at stake and the profit-sharing 
arrangement to create different experimental conditions. 
Specifically, the empirical work focuses on two central questions. 
1) How does profit-sharing arrangement affect the resources committed by partners in a same-
function alliance? Qualitatively, the model implies that when the market is large in relation to 
each partner's endowment, the equilibrium investment patterns under both profit-sharing 
arrangements are similar. When the market size is small, the level of investment under the 
proportional profit-sharing arrangement is greater than that under the equal profit-sharing 
arrangement. Quantitative predictions about the probabilities of investing 0, c/2, and c units of 
capital, which are easier to refute, are also testable. 
2) Is the investment pattern when products are developed in parallel different from that observed 
in a same-function alliance? Qualitatively, the model predicts that partners developing a new 
product in parallel commit fewer resources for the joint endeavor in comparison to partners in a 
same-function alliance. Quantitative predictions about the actual probabilities of investing 0, c/2 
and c units of capital can also be tested. 
The laboratory test is presented in two parts. Study 1 examines the effect of the profit-
sharing arrangement in same-function alliances. Study 2 contrasts the investment behavior when 
products are developed in parallel against the resource commitment observed in same-function 
alliances when profits are shared equally. 
Study 1: Effect of Profit-Sharing Arrangement in Same-Function Alliances 
Subjects. Seventy-two undergraduate and graduate students participated in the 
experiment. The subjects were recruited through advertisements and class announcements 
promising monetary reward contingent on performance. In addition to their earnings, the subjects 
were paid a show-up fee of $5. All the transactions in the experiment were in an experimental 
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currency called "francs". At the end of the experiment, the cumulative individual payoffs were 
converted into US dollars. Subjects earned between $16 and $20. 
Procedure. The subjects were divided into six sets of twelve players each. Each group 
participated in a single session that lasted about ninety minutes. The experiments were conducted in 
laboratories with computer facilities for studying multi-player, interactive decision making. 
On arriving at the laboratory, the subjects were randomly seated in twelve separate 
computer booths. The subjects were then asked to read the instructions (Appendix 2.1 ), which 
included a detailed example. After reading the instructions, the subjects participated in five practice 
trials designed to familiarize them with the task. Questions about the procedure were answered 
during the practice trials. Further communication between the subjects was strictly prohibited. 
On each trial, the twelve subjects were randomly matched into six pairs. Each of these pairs 
was set to compete with another pair according to a predetermined assignment schedule. The 
assignment schedule ensured that each subject was paired with a different subject in each round and 
competed with a different group on each trial. Consequently, the subjects had no way of knowing 
the identity of their partner or competitors on any given trial. 
At the commencement of the experiment the subjects were informed of the profit-sharing 
arrangement. Partners in an alliance shared the profits either equally or in proportion to their 
investments. At the beginning of each trial, each subject was provided a capital of 2 francs in all the 
experimental conditions (c = 2 francs). The prize for winning the competition, m, was varied over 
the experimental conditions: it was set at 6, 12, or 20 francs (dm = 0.33, 0.17, or 0.1). The profit-
sharing rule, endowment, and prize value remained fixed throughout the experiment. 
Based on the profit-sharing arrangement and the prize at stake, each partner decided how 
much to contribute for the joint endeavor: 0, 1, or 2 francs. Once all the subjects made their 
decisions, the computer calculated the total investment made by each alliance. The alliance that 
invested more won the competition. Ties were counted as losses (i.e., s = 0). 
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At the end of each trial, subjects were informed of the total investments made by the 
winning and losing alliance, the alliance winning the competition, and the subject's payofr_4 
The subjects were provided with paper and pencil to help them record the outcomes of 
previous trials, if they wished to do so. The stage game was played repeatedly for 160 trials except 
in one treatment: Subjects in the medium-reward condition under equal profit-sharing arrangement 
played the game for only 90 trials5• At the end of the experiment, the subjects were paid according 
to their cumulative earnings over the several trials of the experiment, debriefed, and dismissed. 
Experimental Design. The study involved a 2 x 3 between-subjects factorial design with 
two profit-sharing rules (equal and proportional) crossed with three levels of endowment to market 
size ratio (elm = 0.33, 0.17, and 0.10). 
Results. First, we compare the distribution of strategies played by subjects against the 
normative benchmark. Then, we test the empirical distribution of strategies for the differential 
effect of profit-sharing arrangement. We use the Kolmogorov-Smirov (KS) test of goodness of fit 
for comparing distributions. 
Equal Profit-Sharing Arrangement. Table 2 (column 3) reports the relative frequency of the 
strategies played by subjects under the equal profit-sharing rule. These relative frequencies were 
computed across subjects and trials. The corresponding equilibrium predictions are presented in 
column 4. The investment patterns of the subjects in the high- and medium-reward conditions seem 
to be consistent with theory. We can not reject the null hypothesis that the predicted and actual 
4 For example, suppose the capital endowed to each subject at the beginning of a trial is 2 francs, and the prize for winning the 
competition is 6 francs. Let the partners share profits equally. Also suppose that player k of alliance i invests 2 francs and his 
partner invests 1 franc in the new product development research. Let the competing alliance j make a total investment of 2 francs 
in the development of their new product. Alliance i has invested more for developing the new product, so alliance i group wins 
the competition. Each member of the winning alliance gets an equal share of the prize, that is 3 francs each. So, the payoff for 
player k in the winning alliance is 3 francs and the payoff for his partner is 4 francs. Player k' s payoff= endowment - investment 
+ 50% of reward = 2 - 2 + 3 = 3 francs. Payoff for player k' s partner = endowment - investment + 50% of reward = 2 - 1 + 3 = 4 
francs. Similarly, we provided an example to illustrate proportional profit-sharing arrangement (see Appendix 2 for instructions to the 
subjects). 
5 The medium-reward condition under equal profit-sharing arrangement was the first treatment we tested in the lab. In this first 
session we ran the experiment for 90 trials. On recognizing that we can collect more data in an experimental session lasting for 
one and half hours, we increased the number of trials to 160 in subsequent experimental sessions. 
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distributions of strategies are same (K S Du,cJ = 0.074, p > 0.20). Similarly, we can not reject the 
same null hypothesis in the medium-reward condition (D90 = 0.072, p > 0.20). 
---------- Insert Table 2 ----------
Table 2 indicates a discrepancy between actual and predicted aggregate behavior in the low-
reward condition (D16o = 0.167, p < 0.01). In equilibrium, the probability of investing c, c/2, and 0 
francs is 6, 44, and 50 percent of the time, respectively. In contrast, the subjects played these 
strategies 23, 28, and 49 percent of the time, respectively. In the low-reward condition, subjects 
invested 0 francs in approximately half of all the trials as predicted. However, these players 
invested c (or 2 francs) four times more often than predicted, and c/2 (or 1 franc) about 16 percent 
less than predicted. Such a tendency to over-contribute has been observed repeatedly in experiments 
designed to test for provision of public goods (Cooper et al. 1996, see Dawes and Thaler 1988 for 
an overview). 
The overall mean proportions in Table 2 do not reveal whether the relative frequency of the 
strategies steadily changed with experience. The three figures displaying the trends in the choice of 
strategies played by subjects in the high-, medium-, and low-reward conditions across the 160 trials 
(in blocks of 10 trials) are presented in Appendix 2.2. The investment pattern in the high-reward 
condition seems to be very stable over time. There is a small tendency in the medium-reward 
condition for the relative frequency of investing the entire resource (c) to decrease over trials. A 
considerably stronger trend is observed in the low-reward condition with the relative frequency of 
investing c francs steadily declining over trials and approaching equilibrium play. Interestingly, in 
the low-reward condition the observed relative frequencies of the three strategies in the last block of 
ten trials do not differ significantly from the equilibrium predictions (D10 = 0.086, p > 0.1). 
Proportional Profit Sharing. Table 2 reports the actual (column 5) and predicted (column 6) 
distributions of the three strategies in same-function alliances, where profits were shared 
proportionally. The mean proportions are based on the behavior of 12 subjects over 160 trials. 
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In the aggregate, subjects in the high-reward condition (elm = 0.1) conformed remarkably 
well to the equilibrium solution. We cannot reject the null hypothesis that the observed and 
predicted distributions are similar (D160 = 0.041, p > 0.20). The same result holds for the medium-
reward condition (D160 = 0.041, p > 0.20). 
As in the equal profit-sharing rule, we find discrepancies between the actual and the 
predicted behavior of subjects in the low-reward condition. In equilibrium, subjects should invest c, 
c/2, and 0 francs 44.2, 19.7, and 36.1 percent of the time, respectively. In contrast, subjects played 
these strategies 60.6, 8.5, and 30.9 percent of the time. This difference between predicted and actual 
behavior is statistically significant (D160 = 0.164, p < 0.01). 
These overall mean proportions again do not reveal the existence of learning trends, if any, 
across the 160 trials. Figures displaying the trends in the choice of strategies across the 160 trials (in 
blocks of ten trials each) for the high-, medium-, and low-reward conditions are presented in 
Appendix 2.2. After the first two blocks of ten trials each, the results for the high-reward condition 
are very stable. In the medium-reward condition the probability of investing c francs decreases 
while the probability of investing 0 francs increases over time in the direction of equilibrium play. 
In the low-reward condition, we again observe that the relative frequency of investing c francs 
declines across trials in the direction of the equilibrium solution. 
Comparison of the two profit sharing arrangements. Finally, we compare the observed 
behavior under the two profit-sharing arrangements6. Consider the two empirical distributions in 
columns 3 and 5 of Table 2. As predicted by the model, the observed behavior under both the equal 
and proportional profit-sharing arrangements is similar in the high-reward condition. The two-
6 The results of an analysis of variance with 2 between-subjects factors (profit-sharing arrangement and reward condition) are 
consistent with the predictions of the model. This analysis of variance is based on 6480 data points obtained by pooling the first 
90 observations provided by each of the 12 subjects in 6 treatments (2 types of profit sharing arrangements x 3 reward 
conditions). The main effect of reward is significant CFc2.6474> = 412.12, p < 0.001). The model implies that profit-sharing 
arrangement interacts with market size: when market size is large profit-sharing arrangement doesn't matter, but when market is 
small profit-sharing matters. In keeping with the theory, the interaction effect of reward and profit-sharing arrangement is 
significant (FC2.6474> = 66.94, p < 0.001). The investments made by subjects sharing profits proportionally in the low-reward 
condition were high enough to produce a main effect for profit-sharing (F(I.6474> = 137.84, p < 0.001). 
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sample KS test shows no significant difference between the two empirical distributions. (D16o,J60 = 
0.041, p > 0.20). Also consistent with the model, the type of profit-sharing arrangement in the low-
reward condition does matter. Subjects sharing the profit proportionally invested c, c/2, and 0 francs 
60.6, 8.5, and 30.9 percent of the time, whereas the corresponding percentages for subjects sharing 
the profit equally were 22.9, 27.8, and 49.4. The two-sample KS test rejects the null hypothesis that 
these two empirical distributions are equal (D160,160 = 0.377, p < 0.01). In the medium-reward 
condition, we find that both profit-sharing arrangements evoked a similar pattern of investment 
(DJ6o,9o = 0.076, p > 0.20). 
Individual Differences. The mixed strategy equilibrium solution is testable at the individual 
level. Qualitatively, the model predicts that each subject in the low-reward condition, who shares 
profits equally, should invest 0 francs more frequently than either 1 or 2 francs (p1 > p2, p1 > p3). In 
fact, 8 of the 12 subjects in the low-reward condition conformed to this qualitative prediction. 
Similarly, 8 and 11 subjects (out of 12) in the medium- and high-reward condition respectively 
invested in a fashion consonant with theory: p3 > P1 and PJ > P2· When sharing profits 
proportionally, we find that 8, 11, and 12 subjects in the low, medium, and high-reward conditions, 
respectively, conformed to the equilibrium prediction that p3 > Pl and PJ > p1. 
Although few subjects depart from the qualitative predictions, most vary widely from the 
quantitative predictions of the model. To get a better grasp of the variation in individual behavior, 
consider the proportion of trials in which subjects invested 0 francs (p1). Our model predicts that 
subjects in the low-reward condition, who share profits equally, should invest 0 francs 50% of the 
trials. In actuality, the proportion of times subjects invested 0 francs ranged from 0.194 to 0.975. In 
Table 3 we report the frequency distribution of the proportion of times each subject invested 
nothing. We observe that three subjects invested 0 francs in proportions that fall in the interval 0.4-
0.5 but none in the interval 0.5-0.6. In the medium-reward condition, subjects invested 0 francs in 
proportions ranging from 0 to 0.5, while the equilibrium prediction is 0.135. Only three subjects 
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invested in proportions that fall in the interval 0.1-0.2. Subjects in the high-reward condition should 
invest 0 francs on 0.062 fraction of trials. Instead, they invested 0 francs in proportions ranging 
from 0 to 0.344. Interestingly, eight subjects invested in proportions that lie in the interval 0-0.1. As 
evident in Table 3, individuals sharing profits proportionally also varied a lot from the point 
predictions of the model. Similar individual level variation was observed, but not reported here, in 
the pattern of investing 1 and 2 francs as well. 
---------Insert Table 3 about here---------
Another important implication of the equilibrium solution is that subjects should mix 
their strategies. If subjects were to independently draw each investment decision from an 
underlying probability distribution, then the sequential dependency in their investment decisions 
would not be more than that implied by a random process. For example, the probability of 
investing nothing on trials t-1 and t should equal p/. In our experiment, the subjects were paired 
with a different subject in each trial in order to minimize reputation effects. Recognizing that the 
researcher is randomizing the pairings, the subjects could well play pure strategies. But these 
subjects mixed their strategies, though not as perfectly as the theory demands.7 This observation 
7 None of the subjects in the low-reward condition (equal-sharing arrangement) played the same pure strategy in all the 160 
trials. But 2 subjects in the medium-reward condition and 3 subjects in the high-reward condition played pure strategies. The 
other subjects mixed strategies. However, in general subjects sharing profits equally evinced some sequential dependency in their 
investment decision (p < 0.001). In particular, the investment decisions of 9, 2 and 6 subjects in the low, medium and high-
reward conditions, respectively showed sequential dependency (p < 0.05). Shifting attention to alliances with proportional profit-
sharing arrangement, we find 7 subjects who played pure strategies: 3 subjects in the low, I in the medium, and 3 in the high-
reward condition. Again, in general subjects sharing profits proportionally showed sequential dependency (p < 0.001). 
Specifically, 7, 8 and 5 subjects in the low, medium and high-reward conditions, respectively, mixed strategies but with inertia (p 
< 0.05). We also examined the level of sequential dependency in each of the treatments at the aggregate level. Again, we find 
that the investment decisions of subjects didn't follow zero-order behavior. In general, we observe inertia in their choice of 
strategies: the probability of repeating a strategy played in the last period is greater than the square of the marginal probability of 
playing that strategy (see Appendix 2.3 for the transition matrices). Such an inertia in investment decisions has also been reported 
by Rapoport and Amaldoss (in press). However, Rapoport and Boebel (1992) and Budescu and Rapoport (1994) observed over-
alternation of strategies. We attribute the difference in the direction of bias to a basic difference in the design of these 
experiments. In our experiment, subjects were re-paired from trial to trial and set to compete with a different alliance. Similarly, 
Rapoport and Amaldoss used a random-pairing design. Rapoport and Boebel (1992), and Budescu and Rapoport (1994) used a 
fixed-pairing design. When pairing is fixed there is a tendency to over-alternate strategies such that one's strategy can be 
concealed from the opponent. It seems reasonable to conclude that subjects under-alternate strategies in case of random pairing, 
and over-alternate strategies if pairing is fixed. 
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is consistent with the finding that human beings are poor at producing a random sequence when 
instructed to do so (Wagenaar 1972, Treisman and Faulkner 1987). 8 
Study 2: Effect of Type of Alliance on the Resources Committed by the Partners 
Study 1 examined the effect of profit-sharing arrangement in same-function alliances on the 
resources committed by alliance partners. Study 2 seeks to investigate the effect of type of alliance. 
Toward this goal, we included a set of three new experimental conditions on parallel alliances. 
Partners in these alliances shared their profit equally. In Study 1 we already included three 
conditions on the investment behavior of partners in same-function alliances where profits were 
shared equally. We pooled data from these six conditions to answer the question whether the type 
of alliance affects the resources committed by a partner to the collaboration. 
Subjects. Another set of thirty-six students was recruited from the same population of 
subjects for studying parallel development of products. Twelve subjects participated in each of 
the three experimental conditions. The subjects were paid a show-up fee of $5 in addition to the 
money they earned in the experiment. The subjects earned between $16 and $20, and spent about 
90 minutes in this experiment. 
Procedure. The experimental procedure closely follows the one outlined in Study 1. A key 
difference in this experiment was how the winning alliance was determined. Each subject was 
endowed with 2 francs at the beginning of each trial in all the experimental conditions (c = 2 
francs). But the size of prize, m, differed between conditions. Specifically, we set m at 6, 12, or 20 
francs so that elm is 0.33, 0.17, or 0.1 as in Study 1. Neither the endowment nor reward changed 
during the entire duration of the experiment. Once all the subjects made their investment decisions, 
the computer calculated the maximum investment made by an individual in each of the two 
8 To test for learning effects, we divided the trials into blocks of I 0 trials each. We used the first 9 blocks of observations provided 
by each of the 12 subjects in the 6 treatments (2 profit-sharing arrangements x 3 reward conditions) for an analysis of variance. 
Specifically, we conducted an analysis of variance with 2 between-subjects factors (profit-sharing arrangement and reward condition) 
and I within-subject factor (block) with repeated measures. We find a highly significant main effect for block (F<8•528 > = 4.26, p < 
0.009). The two-way and three-way interaction effects of block are not significant. Again we notice variation in learning at the 
individual level. For example, 10, 3 and 6 subjects in the low-, medium-, and high-reward condition sharing profits equally show 
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competing alliances. The alliance whose maximum investment was higher was declared the winner. 
Ties were counted as losses (s = 0). At the end of each trial, subjects were informed of the 
maximum investment made by the winning and losing alliances, the alliance winning the 
competition, and the individual payoff for the trial. The subjects participated in five practice rounds, 
and then advanced to play the 160 trials. 
Experimental Design. Study 2 involved a 3 x 2 between-subjects factorial design with three 
levels of endowment to market size ratio (elm= 0.33, 0.17, 0.11) and two types of alliances. 
Results. We first address how well the model accounts for the behavior of partners 
developing products in parallel. Then, we test for the differential effect of type of alliance on the 
behavior of partners. We use the KS test of goodness of fit for comparing distributions. 
Parallel Development of New Products. Table 4 (column 3) reports the actual distribution of 
strategies computed across subjects and trials when profits were shared equally. Whereas subjects 
in the high-reward condition (elm = 0.1) were expected to invest c, c/2, and 0 capital 38.5, 15.1 and 
46.4 percent of the time, respectively, in actuality they contributed 2, 1, and 0 francs 40.8, 18.0, and 
41.2 percent of the time. The KS test does not reject the null hypothesis that the theoretical and 
observed distributions are equal (D160 = 0.052, p > 0.20). The same result holds for both the 
medium- (DI60 = 0.044, p > 0.20) and the low-reward (D160 = 0.093, p > 0.10) conditions. The 
support for the mixed strategy equilibrium solution in all three conditions is remarkably strong. 
---------Insert Table 4 about here---------
Figures displaying the trends in the distribution of strategies across blocks of I 0 trials are 
included in Appendix 2.2. In the high-reward condition, the distribution of strategies stabilizes after 
two to three blocks of trials. In contrast, the probability of investing 2 francs increases and the 
probability of investing 0 francs decreases over time in the medium-reward condition. In the low-
significant to marginally significant learning effect (p < 0.1). Further 6, 8 and 2 subjects sharing profits proportionally in the low, 
medium and high-reward conditions, respectively, show similar learning effects. 
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reward condition, we find a very slow increase in the probability of investing all the resources and a 
corresponding slow decline in the other two probabilities. 
Comparison of same-function a1liance and parallel development of products. Having 
examined the empirical distribution of strategies for parallel development of new products, we 
proceed to answer the question: Does the type of a1liance affect the level of resources committed by 
a partner to the collaboration? Comparison of the two distributions (column 3 of Table 2 for same-
function alliance and column 3 of Table 4 for parallel development of products) indicates that the 
behavior of subjects is in keeping with the model9• The investments are considerably lower when 
products are developed in parallel. In the high-reward condition, partners in same-function alliances 
invested more as predicted by theory. Subjects in same-function alliances contributed 2, 1, and 0 
francs 80.3, 10.6 and 9.2 percent of the time, respectively. In contrast, subjects developing the 
product in parallel invested 2, 1, and 0 francs 40.8, 18.0, and 41.2 percent of the time, even though 
the reward condition was same. Using a two-sample KS test, we reject the null hypothesis that these 
two empirical distribution of strategies are the same (D16o,16o = 0.395, p < 0.01). As predicted by 
the model, partners in same-function alliances invested more in the medium- and low-reward 
conditions as well. The distribution of strategies differed with the type of alliance both in the 
medium- (D160,90 = 0.35, p < 0.01) and low-reward (D16o,I60 = 0.16, p < 0.05) conditions. 
Individual Differences. In equilibrium, individual subjects in parallel alliances should invest 
0 francs more frequently than 1 or 2 francs irrespective of the reward condition. We find that 10, 6 
and 5 subjects (out of 12) in the low-, medium-, and high-reward conditions comply with this 
requirement. Turning to quantitative predictions, subjects in the low-reward condition should invest 
0 francs on 69.3% of the trials. In actuality, subjects invested 0 francs in proportions ranging from 
0.220 to 0.925, with the investments of three subjects falling in the interval 0.6-0.7 (see Table 3). 
9 The results of an analysis of variance based on 6,480 data points obtained by pooling the first 90 observations provided by each of 
12 subjects in the 6 treatments (2 types of alliances x 3 reward conditions) are consonant with the model. The main-effect for type of 
alliance is significant (F0 ,6474> = 713.76, p < 0.0001 ). Besides the main effect for reward condition (F12,6474> = 390.08, p < 0.001) is 
also significant. 
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Subjects in the medium-reward condition invested 0 francs in proportions ranging from 0.038 to 
0.913. The prediction is 0.550, and none of the 12 subjects invested in proportions within the 
interval 0.5-0.6. Subjects in the high-reward condition should invest 0 francs on 46.4% of the trials. 
Table 3 shows that only one subject invested 0 francs within the band 0.4-0.5. Similar individual-
level variation was observed in the proportion of times subjects invested 1 and 2 francs. 10• 11 
Discussion. We find that the aggregate behavior of the subjects is accounted for by the 
equilibrium solution. As predicted, profit-sharing arrangement did not affect the investment pattern 
of subjects in same-function alliances when they were in the high-reward condition. Subjects 
developing products in parallel invested less than subjects in same-function alliance, irrespective of 
the reward condition. 
We notice that the theory seems to under-predict investments in low-reward conditions. 
A plausible explanation for this significant departure from the normative benchmark is that 
subjects in the low-reward condition were influenced by some altruistic regard for their partners. 
Such a tendency to over-commit resources relative to the normative benchmark has been 
observed in experimental tests of Prisoner's Dilemma, Ultimatum game and Dictator game (e.g., 
Dawes and Thaler 1988, Cooper et al. 1996). 12 
10 Again we notice that subjects mixed strategies, though not perfectly. Except for one subject in the medium-reward condition, 
subjects developing products in parallel mixed strategies. In general, these subjects mixed strategies with some sequential 
dependencies in their choices (p < 0.001). Specifically, 10, 7, and 9 subjects in the low, medium and high-reward conditions 
mixed with at least marginal sequential dependency (p < 0.10). 
11 We also noticed variation in learning at the individual level. Firstly, to test for learning at the aggregate level, we used the first 
9 blocks of observation provided by each of the 12 subjects in the 6 treatments (2 types of alliance x 3 reward conditions). 
Specifically, we conducted an analysis of variance with 2 between-subjects factors (type of alliance and reward condition) and I 
within-subject factor (block) with repeated measures. We found a significant main effect for blocks (F<s.m > = 2.41, p < 0.0146). The 
two-way and three-way interaction effects of block were not significant. Secondly, at the individual level we found that 8, 5 and 7 in 
the low, medium and high-reward conditions showed marginal to significant learning effects (p < 0.1 ). 
12 An alternative plausible explanation for the observed tendency of subjects to over-invest in low-reward conditions (along with 
the tendency to under-invest in the high and medium-reward conditions) is that subjects were implicitly avoiding the undesirable 
outcome of alliances being tied. To examine this issue, we compared the theoretical and empirical distribution of wins, ties and 
losses when sharing profits equally (3 reward conditions x 2 types of alliances). Interestingly, we find that the theoretical and 
empirical distribution of the relative frequencies of wins, ties and losses are remarkably consonant. In Appendix 2.3 we report the 
comparison of the actual and theoretical distribution, along with the corresponding KS test results. For instance, same-function 
alliances sharing profits equally if in the low-reward condition (dm = 0.33) should win, tie and lose on 33.91, 32.17 and 33.91 
percent of the trials as per the equilibrium solution. In actuality, we observe that these same-function alliances won, tied and lost 
on 37.7, 24.61 and 37.7 percent of the trials. The KS test fails to reject the null hypothesis that these two distributions are similar 
(D160 = 0.0378, p > 0.2). Likewise, we cannot reject the null hypothesis in the medium- and the high-reward conditions (Medium 
reward: D90 = 0.0332, p > 0.2, high reward: D160 = 0.0724, p > 0.2). These findings suggest that the marginal deviation from the 
theoretical prediction noticed among subjects sharing profits equally in the low-reward condition of same-function alliances may 
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These two experiments also provide a useful clarification about the support for mixed 
strategy equilibrium: Aggregate behavior conforms to the equilibrium solution, though the behavior 
of individual subjects varies substantially from the norm. Individual-level analysis suggests that 
subjects mixed their strategies, but not as often as the theory demands. This inertia in choice of 
strategies in consistent with learning trends observed in the investment pattern. 
5. Conclusion 
This research was motivated by our desire to examine the effect of profit-sharing 
arrangement and type of alliance on the resource commitments of alliance partners. Toward this 
goal, we developed a game-theoretic model of competition between two alliances and then tested 
its ability to predict the actual resource commitments of alliance partners in two separate 
experiments. 
Summary and Managerial Implications. Our model implies that when the reward for 
winning the competition is high, the competitive investment patterns under both proportional and 
equal profit-sharing arrangements are comparable for same-function alliances. The aggregate 
behavior of financially motivated agents in our experimental setting conforms closely to this 
prediction. An important implication of this finding is that alliance managers can place faith on 
the market to discipline the behavior of partners and avoid costly monitoring procedures. 
Do managers of real-world alliances behave in a fashion consistent with our theoretical and 
experimental findings? Although a complete answer to this question is beyond the scope of this 
research, we undertook a preliminary investigation to explore this issue. We analyzed the field data 
on 53 technology alliances covered as part of the 1994 Wharton Study on Innovation Development 
(Robertson and Gatignon 1998). The field data included responses of alliance managers to a 
battery of questions related to market attractiveness, partner's commitment to the joint endeavor 
not be a substantial deviation if looked at the level of alliances rather than individuals. Again, we notice in same-function 
alliances sharing profits proportionally that the difference between the predicted and actual distribution of wins, ties and losses 
are not significant irrespective of the reward condition (High reward: D 160 = 0.0429, p > 0.2, Medium reward: D 160 = 0.0285, p 
> 0.2, Low reward: D 160 = 0.0346, p > 0.2). Similar results were obtained for parallel alliances. 
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and how partners shared the benefits from the alliance. An analysis of this field data provides 
correlational support for our model predictions on same function alliance. Specifically, we find 
that resources committed by alliance partners are related to the attractiveness of the market, but not 
affected by the share of the likely benefits from the collaboration. However, the interaction effect of 
market attractiveness and share of benefit is marginally significant, implying that resource 
commitment increases more rapidly as the market attractiveness increases when partners share 
profits equally. 13 Clearly, the circumstances of these real-world decisions are more complex than 
those characterized by our stylized model, and these empirical measures are based on perceived, 
rather than the actual, behavior of partners in these technology alliances. Yet, these field results are 
directionally consistent with both the theory and the experimental evidence. 
The other major result concerns the effect of type of alliance on the investment behavior of 
partners. This issue has not been previously addressed in strategic alliance literature. We find that 
partners in a same-function alliance commit more resources than those developing products in 
parallel. Among partners developing a product in parallel, those sharing profits equally commit 
fewer resources than those sharing profits proportionally. Again, the aggregate behavior of subjects 
in a controlled laboratory setting conforms remarkably well to the quantitative predictions of the 
model. Parallel product development is seen in industries such as biotechnology and information 
technology, where technological uncertainties are high. It is useful for alliance managers to know 
13 PARTNER'S RESOURCE COMMITMENT (Cronbach's Alpha= 0.8173). The items in this scale are: I) some of their best R&D 
personnel to the alliance were allocated to the alliance (item to total correlation= 0.6510), 2) The alliance represented a fairly small 
commitment of their resources (0.6117), 3) the alliance was a major percent of their R&D investment (0. 7297) and 4) the alliance 
involved very specific investment in technological understanding (0.5637). 
MARKET A1TRACTIVENESS (Cronbach's Alpha= 0.8700). the items in this scale are: I) it is a high growth market (item to total 
correlation= 0.8110), 2) customer demand is growing rapidly for the product category (0.7979), and 3) product category growth is 
negligible -reversed (0.6513). 
SHARE OF BENEFIT (Cronbach's Alpha= 0.5821). The items in this scale are: I) we benefited from the alliance more than our 
partner - reversed (0.41 05), 2) our alliance partner benefited from the alliance more than we did (0.41 05). 
The bivariate correlation between market attractiveness and partner's resource commitment is significant (p = 0.414, p < 0.002). The 
bivariate correlation between share of benefit and resource commitment is not significant (p > 0.4 ). Next, we tested simultaneously 
the effect of market attractiveness and share of benefit. We find that resource commitment is related to market attractiveness (F0 ,47)= 
2.87, p < 0.098). The manner by which the benefit of collaboration is shared does not affect resource commitment (Fc2.47) = 0.92, p > 
0.40). The interaction effect of market and share of benefit is marginally significant (Fo.4?) = 2.33, p < 0.1 0). 
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that although parallel development of products alleviates technological uncertainty, it heightens 
under-investment problem. 
The 1991 McKinsey survey of alliances found that alliances where partners share profits 
equally are often successful. This finding is tenable if partners are pooling similar resources and see 
the rewards for successful collaboration as being particularly large and enduring, such that 
instincts to free ride were overridden by the perceived attractiveness of the large end prize. 14 If 
the market attractiveness is low or the type of alliance calls for resources to be pooled as the 
maximum of inputs - such as when new products are being developed in parallel - then the 
McKinsey finding might not hold. Thus, our theoretical analysis and experimental investigation 
help in gaining a richer understanding of the effects of profit-sharing arrangement and type of 
alliance on the commitment of alliance partners. 
Model Limitations and Extensions. In this initial study of inter-alliance competition, we 
made several restrictive assumptions. For instance, we assumed that alliance partners have the 
same capital; we restricted the investment strategy space to three levels (0, c/2 and c); and we 
assumed that the winner takes the entire market. We discuss below the implications of relaxing 
some of these restrictive assumptions. 
We examined the effect of asymmetric distribution of endowments among partners in a 
same-function alliance. Proposition I is based on analyzing the case where partners in an alliance 
are endowed with the same amount of capital. We find that even if partners are endowed with 
unequal amounts of capital, profit-sharing arrangement does not matter when the market is large. 
Specifically, consider the case where the weak partner in an alliance is endowed with c/2 units of 
capital (cu = CjJ = c/2) whereas the strong partner is endowed with c units of capital (c;2 = CJ2 = 
c/2). The weak partner can invest 0, c/4, or c/2 units of capital in the joint endeavor; while the 
14 Also note that equal profit sharing has an important advantage: It does not entail costly monitoring. Therefore, in 
circumstances where both profit-sharing arrangements evoke comparable levels of resource commitment and it costs to monitor 
performance, alliances sharing profits equally could potentially be more successful than those sharing profits proportionally. In 
fact, the McKinsey study found that only 30% of alliance sharing profits not equally, but in proportion to their investment, were 
successful. In our model we have not considered the cost of monitoring. 
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strong partner can invest 0, el4, c/2, 3el4 or c. This game has only a mixed strategy solution (see 
Appendix 1.17 for proof). In the low-reward condition (elm = 0.33), we find that partners sharing 
profits equally invest less than those sharing profits proportionally. However, in the high-reward 
condition (elm = 0.1), the investments under both profit-sharing arrangements are similar. 15 
We also examined the equilibrium solution when partners are allowed to invest 0, el4, c/2 
and 3el4 and c units of capital instead of just 0, c/2 and c16• We find that the qualitative 
implications of our theoretical analysis still hold. Specifically, profit-sharing arrangement does 
not matter in same-function alliances if the market is large. 
We can also relax the winner-take-all assumption by allowing for a side benefit. For 
example, the new product may offer synergy to the existing product portfolio. IT we allow for 
such a side benefit, then the losing alliance would get the side benefit and thus the inter-alliance 
game would not be a winner-take-all game. Again, allowing for a side benefit does not modify 
the qualitative implications of our earlier results (see Amaldoss 1998 for details). 
Future Research. Our model can be extended to consider the case of cross-functional 
alliances. The Siemens-Coming alliance for producing and marketing fibre-optic cables is a case 
of cross-functional alliance. Coming manufactures cables using patented process, while Siemens 
distributes the cable worldwide (Bleeke and Ernst 1991 ). Partners in such an alliance add value 
to the new product serially. A cross-functional alliance resembles a chain, which is only as strong 
15 In the low-reward condition (dm =0.33), weak partners sharing profits equally should invest 0, d4 and c/2 in proportions 
0.399, 0.413 and 0.188, respectively (mean investment = 0.2), while those sharing profits proportionally should invest in 
proportions 0.177, 0.124 and 0.699 (mean investment= 0.4). The strong partners sharing profits equally should invest 0, d4, c/2, 
3d4 and c in proportions 0.400, 0.031, 0.174, 0.215 and 0.180, respectively (mean investment = 0.45), while those sharing 
profits proportionally should invest in proportions 0.288, 0.066, 0.043, 0, and 0.602 (mean investment = 0.65). In the high-
reward condition (dm = 0.1), weak partners sharing profits equally should invest 0, d4 and c in proportions 0.023, 0.062, and 
0.915 respectively (mean investment = 0.47), while those sharing profits proportionally should invest in proportions 0.038, 
0.020, and 0.942 (mean investment = 0.47). The strong partners sharing profits equally should invest 0, d4, c/2, 3d4 and c in 
proportions 0.055, 0.050,0.040, 0, and 0.853 respectively (mean investment= 0.9) while partners sharing profits proportionally 
should invest 0.078, 0.030, 0, 0.001 and 0.891 (mean investment= 0.9). 
16 The equilibrium solution for partners in a same-function alliance, who share profits equally, is as follows. When the reward 
condition is low (dm = 0.33) each player should invest 0, d4, c/2, 3d4 and c with probability 0.248, 0.045, 0.235, 0.471 and 0 
respectively. Players in the medium-reward condition (dm = 0.17) should invest 0, d4, c/2, 3d4 and c with probabilities 0.240. 
0.125, 0.118, 0.141 and 0.376 respectively. In the high-reward condition (dm = 0.1) these players should invest 0, d4, c/2, 3c/4 
and c with probabilities 0.264, 0.063, 0.063, 0.063 and 0.547 respectively. The system of equations that provide the equilibrium 
solution is presented in Appendix 1.18. 
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as its weakest link. We can model such an alliance by allowing the utility of the new product to 
be determined by the minimum individual input of the partners in an alliance. The competition 
between cross-functional alliances takes an interesting form. As the minimum input of a partner 
in such an alliance determines the utility of the new product, there is no incentive for a firm to 
contribute more than its partner. At the same time, it hurts a firm to contribute less than its 
partner, as it reduces the prospect of winning the competition and gaining a share of the market. 
So, partners in a cross-functional alliance are involved in a coordination game that has multiple 
Nash equilibria in pure strategies. In contrast to same-function alliance and parallel development 
of products, in cross-functional alliances coordination of actions and size of side benefit are 
important (See Amaldoss 1998 for details). As deductive analysis of cross-functional alliances 
leads to multiple Nash equilibria, experimental investigation could help identify which 
equilibrium is actually chosen. Extant research on coordination games suggests that people find it 
difficult to coordinate actions, and they often reach the equilibrium with the lowest Pareto rank 
(Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe, and Ross 1990, Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil 1990). However, past 
research on coordination games has not considered competition between groups. In the proposed 
model of competition between cross-functional alliances, the Nash equilibria can be Pareto 
ranked. It would be interesting to investigate whether competition facilitates coordination to a 
Pareto efficient solution. 
We observed that the aggregate behavior of subjects conformed to the point-predictions of 
the model, despite substantial individual-level variation in the choice of strategies. Further, 
individual subjects evinced sequential dependencies in their choice of strategies. It will be 
interesting to investigate how well adaptive learning mechanisms can account for the behavior of 
individual subjects (Camerer and Ho 1999, Erev and Rapoport 1998, Mookherjee and Sopher 
1997, Roth and Erev 1995). Such an analysis can shed light on whether the behavior of subjects 
were guided by reinforcement mechanisms or changes in beliefs about other players. It will be 
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useful to collect cognitive data to understand better the decision processes that underpins the 
strategic behavior of subjects. Such investigations can be helpful in developing game-theoretic 
models that better describe the actions of boundedly rational agents. 
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Table 1. Payoff Matrices for the Intra-Alliance Conflict and Inter-Alliance Competition 
Intra-Alliance Conflict 
Player i2' s investment 
c c/2 0 
Player i/s c - c,- c - c,- c/2 - c, 0 
Investment c/2 - c/2, -c - c/2,- c/2 - c/2, 0 
0 0,- c 0,- c/2 0,0 
The Inter-Alliance Competition 
U(i) 
0 c/2 c 3c/2 2c 
0 s, s 0, m 0, m 0, m 0, m 
U(j) c/2 m, 0 S, s 0, m 0, m 0, m 
c m, 0 m, 0 S, s 0, m 0, m 
3c/2 m, 0 m, 0 m, 0 s, s 0, m 
2c m, 0 m, 0 m, 0 m, 0 s, s 
Note: c is the investment capital available to each partner in the alliance ( c >0 ), 
m is the value of the market that the winning alliance captures (m > 2c), and 
s is the value of the market each alliance gets in case there is a tie, s E ( 0, m/2) 
39 
Table 2. Comparison of Observed and Predicted Choice of Investments by 
Same-Function Alliances 
Profit -Sharing Arrangement 
Reward Investment 
Equal Proportional Condition 
Observed Equilibrium Observed Equilibrium 
Behavior Prediction Behavior 
Prediction 
High Reward High (c) 0.803 0.877 0.844 0.885 
(clm=0.1) 
Medium (c/2) 0.106 0.060 0.032 0.028 
Low (0) 0.092 0.062 0.123 0.087 
Medium Reward High (c) 0.669 0.741 0.745 0.786 
(elm= 0.17) 
Medium (c/2) 0.141 0.123 0.074 0.052 
Low (0) 0.191 0.135 0.181 0.161 
Low Reward High (c) 0.229 0.062 0.606 0.442 
(elm= 0.33) 
Medium (c/2) 0.278 0.436 0.085 0.197 
Low (0) 0.494 0.502 0.309 0.361 
Note: c is the investment capital available to each partner in the alliance, and m is the value of the market that the 
winning alliance captures. Keeping c = 2 francs, we varied m to 20, 12 and 6 francs such that elm = 0.1, 0.17 and 
0.33 respectively. So the reward for winning the competition is high when elm= 0.1, and low when elm= 0.33. 
40 
Table 3. Individual Behavior of Subjects 
Frequency Distribution of Subjects by Proportion of Times They Invested Nothing 
Same-Function Alliances 
Frequency Distribution of Subjects Total 
Treatment Proportion of times subjects invested nothing Subjects 
0-0.1 0.1-0.2 0.2-0.3 0.3-0.4 0.4-0.5 0.5-0.6 0.6-0.7 0.7-0.8 0.8-0.9 0.9-1 
Equal Profit Sharing 
Low 1 2 0 1 3* 0 2 2 0 1 12 
Medium 4 3* 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 I2 
High 8* 2 I I 0 0 0 0 0 0 I2 
Proportional Profit Sharing 
Low 6 1 0 1* 0 0 2 0 2 0 12 
Medium 7 0* 2 I I I 0 0 0 0 I2 
High 7* 0 4 I 0 0 0 0 0 0 I2 
Parallel Development of Products 
Frequency Distribution of Subjects Total 
Treatment Proportion of times subjects invested nothing Subjects 
0-0.I O.I-0.2 0.2-0.3 0.3-0.4 0.4-0.5 0.5-0.6 0.6-0.7 0.7-0.8 0.8-0.9 0.9-I 
Equal Profit Sharing 
Low 0 0 0 3 I 0 3* I 2 2 I2 
Medium I 2 1 I 2 0* I I I 2 I2 
High 3 2 0 2 1* I 0 0 I 2 I2 
Note: I. * indicates the cell in which the equilibrium solution lies 
2. As per theory, partners in same-function if sharing profits equally should invest nothing in proportions 
0.502 (low-reward condition), 0.135 (medium reward) and 0.062 (high reward); but if sharing profits 
proportionally they should invest 0 francs in proportions 0.36I (low reward), 0.161 (medium reward) 
and 0.087 (high reward). 
3. Partners developing products in parallel should invest nothing in proportions 0.693 (low reward), 0.550 
(medium reward) and 0.464 (high reward condition) according to the equilibrium solution. 
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Table 4. Comparison of Observed and Predicted Choice of Investment made by 
Parallel Alliances 
Reward Condition Investment Observed Equilibrium 
Behavior Prediction 
High (c) 0.408 0.385 
High reward (elm = 0.1) Medium (c/2) 0.180 0.151 
Low (0) 0.412 0.464 
High (c) 0.315 0.271 
Medium reward (elm= 0.17) Medium (c/2) 0.171 0.179 
Low (0) 0.514 0.550 
High (c) 0.175 0.081 
Low reward (elm= 0.33) Medium (c/2) 0.170 0.225 
Low (0) 0.655 0.693 
Note: c is the investment capital available to each partner in the alliance, and m is the value of the market that the 
winning alliance captures. Keeping c = 2 francs, we varied m to 20, 12 and 6 francs such that elm = 0.1, 0.17 and 
0.33 respectively. So the reward for winning the competition is high when elm= 0.1, and low when elm= 0.33. 
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Figure 2A: Parallel Development 
Investment Pattern under Equal Profit-Sharing 
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